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  Many philosophers say that the nature of personal identity has to
do with narratives:  the stories we tell about ourselves.  While different
narrativists address different questions of personal identity, some propose
narrativist accounts of personal identity over time.  The paper argues that
such accounts have troubling consequences about the beginning and end of
our lives, lead to inconsistencies, and involve backwards causation.  The
problems can be solved, but only by modifying the accounts in ways that
deprive them of their appeal.
  narrativism, narrative identity, personal identity
A growing number of philosophers propose narrativist accounts of
personal identity.  The nature of personal identity, they say, has something
to do with the stories we tell about ourselves.  Narratives can be Òidentity-
constitutingÓ.
There are many different questions of personal identity (Olson 2016,
¤1), and not all narrativists address the same one.  Some are concerned
with the so-called Òcharacterization questionÓ, others with the Òpersistence
questionÓ.  Some never make it entirely clear which they mean.  But there
are two very different sorts of narrativism.
The characterization question expresses what nonphilosophers typically
mean when they speak of personal identity.  It asks for someoneÕs most
characteristic or distinctive properties:  those that Òdefine her as a personÓ
or Òmake her the person she isÓ (cf. Glover 1988: 109f., Schechtman 1996:
1f., 74).  They are typically mental and behavioral properties:
commitments, preferences, beliefs, character traits, and the like.  It is
common to refer to these properties collectively as a personÕs ÒidentityÓ.
To have an Òidentity crisisÓ is to become unsure of oneÕs most characteristic
properties.  If, in an anguished moment, I ask, ÒWho am I?Ó, I want to know
what sort of person, in some deep and fundamental sense, I am.
Narrativist accounts of characterization say that the properties making
someone the person she is have to do with narratives (cf. DeGrazia 2005:
82f., Schechtman 1996: 94, D. Shoemaker 2009: 89-91).  An answer to the
characterization question will take the form of an autobiographical story.
1Olson and Witt are equal co-authors and their names appear in alphabetical
order.
2Who am I?  Well, I am someone who has done or experienced this and that,
which has led, in certain ways, to my having such-and-such commitments,
preferences, character traits, and so on.  What makes me the person I am is
the stories I tell.
The characterization question asks for certain mental and behavioral
properties of someone.  The persistence question, by contrast, asks what it
takes for someone to continue existing from one time to another, or what
makes a past or future being you.  It is the question of personal identity over
time.2  An answer will be a completion of the formula
Necessarily, if x is a person at a time t and y exists at another time t*, x=y
iff...x...t...y...t*...,
where the Ô=Õ sign expresses numerical identity.  Lockeans fill the blanks with
something to do with psychological continuity:  what makes a past or future
being you is for the mental states she is in then to be causally dependent, in
a certain way, on those you are in now, or vice versa.  Animalists fill them
with some sort of brute-physical continuity having no psychological
component:  what makes a past or future being you is its being the same
biological organism that you are.  Narrativist accounts of persistence are
presented as an alternative to these familiar views.  They say that what
makes a past or future being you is something else, to do with narrative
connections.
The view is no straw man.  Some narrativists explicitly address the
persistence question.  Jeanine and Robert Schroer, for example, propose a
narrativist answer to Òthe question of (diachronic) personal identityÓ--that is,
Òthe question of what makes a person (x) at time t1 and a person (y) at time
t2 the same personÓ (2014: 446).  Anthony Rudd says that Òthe concept of
narrative...is central to thinking about the identity of persons across time.Ó3
And although Marya Schechtman claims to be primarily concerned with
characterization (1996: 2, 94; 2014: 100), she sees her view as addressing
the worry that Òpsychological continuity theories...do not allow for the
persistence of a single, experiencing subjectÓ:
[W]e need a view according to which personal identity implies sameness
of experiencing subject.  We have seen that the narrative self-
constitution view is just such an account.  The formation of an identity-
3Rudd 2009: 60; see also Merkel et al. 2007: 266, 275; Davenport 2012:
151, 156.
2Some call it the Òreidentification questionÓ.  This name has the
disadvantage of suggesting that the question is about how we go about
identifying the same person at different times, when in fact it concerns what
makes it the case that someone continues existing.  It is a metaphysical, not
an epistemic question.  Given how easily different questions of personal
identity are conflated, names are important.
3constituting narrative creates a single, temporally extended subject of
experience, and any two actions or experiences attributed to the same
person by this view are necessarily attributable to the same subject of
experience (1996: 149).
As you and I are temporally extended (that is, persisting) subjects of
experience, this appears to say that we persist by virtue of Òidentity-
constituting narrativesÓ.  Actions or experiences necessarily belong to the
same subject of experience, and hence the same person, whenever the right
sort of narrative is in place.  Some condition involving narratives is at least
sufficient for a person to persist from one time to another.  Similar
statements abound in her work.4  Both Schechtman and Rudd present their
accounts as rivals to Lockean and animalist views.5  If they were not
answers to the persistence question, they would be entirely compatible with
those views and not rivals at all.6
Our interest is in narrativist accounts of persistence.  (The
characterization question will reappear in the final section.)  We believe that
they face grave objections.  This is in addition to those they share with
psychological-continuity theories.  The principal objection to psychological-
continuity theories arises because they rule out our being biological
organisms:  no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or
sufficient for an organism, including a human animal, to persist (Olson 1997:
94f.).  This raises the awkward question of what sort of non-organisms we
might be, and why a human organism cannot itself be a person.  Persistence
narrativism has the same consequence, as no condition involving narratives
is necessary or sufficient for an organism to persist either.  But we will
ignore this point.
What would a narrativist account of persistence look like?  The proposals
offered have not always been clear or explicit.  The most obvious suggestion
is that the right sort of narrative connection is both necessary and sufficient
for a person to persist.  A past being is you just if you now have narratives
of the right sort identifying you with her as she was then.  A future being is
you just if the narratives she has then identify her with you as you are now.
So:
6 Commentators who take Rudd, Schechtman, and other narrativists to be
giving accounts of persistence include Christman (2004: 695), Stokes
(2012: 86ff.), Goldie (2014: 117), Belohrad (2015: 286f.), and Baker
(2016: 11f.).
5 On Lockeanism see Schechtman 2003: 239, 2014: 99; on animalism see
Schechtman 1996: 130-133, Rudd 2005: 414-417, 2009: 63.
4See Schechtman 1990: 90; 1996: 101f., 124, 132, 143-145, 150-157;
2007: 162, 166, 169f.; 2009: 68, 80; 2014: 101-103.
4Necessarily, if x is a person at a time t and y exists at another time t*,
x=y iff either (1) x has, at t, a narrative of the right sort that identifies x
with y as it is at t* (or there is a chain of such narrative connections), or
(2) y has, at t*, a narrative of the right sort that identifies y with x as it is
at t (or, again, there is a chain of such narratives).
The bits in parentheses are to avoid a well-known transitivity problem.
Suppose that, owing to some pathological condition, the earliest event
figuring in your current self-narratives is your first day at university, but
that on that day the student had narratives extending back to nursery
school.  Without the parenthesis, the proposal would imply that you are the
student and the student is the toddler at nursery, but you are not the
toddler, violating the transitivity of identity (which is a theorem of standard
first-order logic with identity).  Our formulation avoids the problem by
implying that you are the toddler, as you now relate to her as she was then
by a chain of narrative connections.  It may also need a Ònon-branchingÓ
clause to deal with cases where two later beings have narrative connections
to a single earlier one (see Schroer and Schroer 2014: 463).  We will set this
aside.
To understand this proposal we need to know two things.  First, what is
the right sort of narrative?  What makes a narrative Òidentity-constitutingÓ--
the sort that figures in persistence?  And second, what is it to have a
narrative?
Most narrativists say that the stories have to be autobiographical:  you
must be their narrator and central protagonist.  They have to be told by you,
from your point of view.  And they must be about what you take to be your
own life (Schechtman 1996: 124, 142-145; 2007: 167; Rudd 2009: 61).
(We will revisit this claim in ¤8.)
They must also play an explanatory role, saying something about how you
came to have your most characteristic properties--those relevant to the
characterization question--and to undertake the momentous actions in your
life.  An identity-constituting narrative must be Òa story of how the events in
oneÕs history lead to other events in that historyÓ (Schechtman 2007: 160).
Accuracy, however, cannot be required.  The narratives may relate
events that never happened, or give false accounts of real ones.  Otherwise
the view would be circular.  Suppose one of your self-narratives had it that
you won the sack race at the St BrutusÕs Primary School sports day in 1963.
In order to verify this, we should have to know whether the winner of the
race (supposing it actually took place) was you or someone else, which is a
fact about your persistence.  We should have to know which past being was
you before we could apply the theory that was supposed to tell us this.
 Having a narrative is understood dispositionally (Schechtman 2007: 161;
Rudd 2009: 62; Schroer and Schroer 2014: 455).  You need not consciously
formulate the story.  You must only be in some way disposed to tell it in
certain circumstances.
5To simplify formulations, we will abbreviate the phrase
x has, at t, a narrative of the right sort that identifies x with y as it is at
t* (or there is a chain of such narrative connections), or y has, at t*, a
narrative of the right sort that identifies y with x as it is at t (or there is a
chain of such narratives)
as
x is narratively continuous, at t, with y as it is at t*.
So the proposal is that a past or future being is you just if he or she is then
narratively continuous with you as you are now.  Our persistence consists
entirely in narrative continuity:  nothing more is needed, nothing less will
suffice.  Call this pure narrativism.
Pure narrativism is hopeless.  Suppose you become convinced that you
are Shakespeare reincarnated.  ItÕs part of the story in terms of which you
understand your life that you were born in the 16th century, acted at the
Globe, wrote the plays and poems attributed to Shakespeare, and so on.  You
have a detailed account of how these events affect your current character
and the principal events of your life since your latest reincarnation.  It is all a
delusion got from history books, but you have forgotten this and take
yourself to have genuine memories of events from the poetÕs life.  The story
might be perfectly coherent and entirely sincere.  It identifies you with
Shakespeare, making you narratively continuous with him as he was then.  It
follows from pure narrativism that you really are Shakespeare.
The obvious response is to add a further condition.  Your having an
appropriate narrative connection to a past or future being is necessary for
him or her to be you, but more is needed.  Schechtman proposes a Òreality
constraintÓ:  though identity-constituting narratives need not be entirely
true, they must be consistent with Òthe basic character of reality and...the
nature of personsÓ (2007: 163; see also 1996: 119-130).  If one of the
facts about Òreality and the nature of personsÓ were that we cannot be
reincarnated, this would solve the problem:  once weÕre dead and our
remains are dispersed, we cannot come back into being.
The trouble with this suggestion is that once again it appeals to a claim
about personal identity over time.  Whether we can be reincarnated depends
on what it takes for us to persist, which is what persistence narrativism was
supposed to tell us.  We should have to know something about our
persistence conditions already, by other means, before we could work out
the theoryÕs implications.
A better thought is that the narratives must be based on real first-person
memories, so that no event could feature in such a story unless one
6remembered it (Schechtman 2007: 167; Schroer and Schroer 2014: 463).
We could then appeal to the fact that no one can remember (or Òquasi-
rememberÓ) experiences had by someone dead and buried, as this blocks the
causal connections that need to hold between an experience and a genuine
memory of it (S. Shoemaker 1984: 81-85).  This is not a fact about our
persistence:  it does not turn on what it takes for a person to continue
existing.  It would rule out your being Shakespeare because you have no
first-person memories of events from his life.
Call this further constraint C, and call the view that our persistence
consists in narrative continuity together with C impure narrativism.
Impure narrativism has its own difficulties.  The most obvious is its
startling consequences about the beginning of our lives.  We do not come
into the world already outfitted with self-narratives.  First we do and undergo
things; only later do we reflect and work them into stories.  We cannot
construct identity-constituting narratives without the cognitive skills needed
to think systematically about past events, which few of us acquire before
age four.  And owing to childhood amnesia, few of us can retrieve memories
from our earliest years.  So by the time you begin to think about your life in
narrative terms, you will probably have no memories of events that took
place before age two at least (Peterson et al. 2005: 626).  And in order to
avoid the Shakespeare problem, narrativists need to say that an event can
figure in your identity-constituting narratives only if you remember it.
Suppose the first event that figures in your self-narratives occurred at
age two.  And suppose, as impure narrativism tells us, that you extend only
as far into the past as those narratives do:  you could not have come into
being before the first events that feature in those stories.  It follows that
you did not exist before your second birthday.  The implication is not merely
that you were not a person then.  (The persistence question is not about
what it is to be a person or a nonperson.)  You did not exist at all.  The child
who was born, learned to walk, and began speaking in simple sentences was
not you, but a numerically different being.  In fact the child could never have
become a person:  if she had, she would have persisted without narrative
continuity during her first years, contrary to impure narrativism.  It follows
that if an ordinary child dies of pneumonia at eighteen months, this neither
kills a person nor prevents any being from becoming a person.  It only
prevents a person from coming into existence, much as contraception does.
Most of us will find this bemusing.
Now standard psychological-continuity theories have a similar
consequence (Olson 1997: 73-76, McMahan 2002: 44-46).  If our
persistence consists in psychological continuity, we could not have existed
before we had any mental properties at all:  as five-month-old foetuses, for
instance.  A foetus of that age persists without any psychological continuity.
It follows that it could never become a person.  The death of a five-month-
7old foetus neither kills a person nor prevents any being from becoming a
person.  It can only prevent a person from coming into existence.  This is
something that psychological-continuity theorists have grudgingly accepted.
But no one, narrativists included, thinks we come into being at age two.
Impure narrativism has surprising consequences about the end of life
too.7  It would make it possible for us to destroy ourselves without incurring
any physical injury.  We need only give up our self-narratives--that is,
eradicate the disposition to tell certain stories.  There would then be no
narrative continuity between ourselves as we are now and ourselves as we
were previously.  If narrative continuity is necessary for us to continue
existing, as narrativism says, this would literally be fatal.  Breaking off all
narrative continuity would not merely end our existence as people, but end
our existence altogether.  There would be no need of tall buildings or
sleeping pills.
Not that this would be easy to do.  We have no direct voluntary control
over our self-constituting narratives.  It is nearly impossible to remember
events from oneÕs past without imposing some sort of narrative on them.
ItÕs as natural as breathing, and requires no more conscious effort.8  But we
could retain the disposition to think narratively without being disposed to tell
any particular story.  This may require a lengthy programme of mental
exercises, hypnosis, or mind-altering drugs, but it does not seem
psychologically impossible, for a time at least.  The result would be complete
narrative discontinuity.  This could happen even if full psychological
continuity is maintained.  (Though psychological continuity may be
necessary for narrative continuity, it cannot also be sufficient.  Otherwise
the viewÕs consequences would be no different from those of psychological-
continuity theories.  It would not be an alternative to standard accounts of
our persistence, but merely Lockeanism in new clothing.)
Or at least we could do this if we ceased permanently to have self-
narratives.  But old habits may creep back.  At some point the resulting
person may devise new stories about the events of your life--events which
he or she would remember as well as you did.  If the new narratives
stretched back to the time when the original stories were extinguished (as
they almost certainly would), this person would be you.  Giving up oneÕs self-
narratives would be a difficult and unreliable method of suicide.
Or rather, its effectiveness would be limited to special cases.  Imagine
that you fall into the hands of bad people who are going to torture you to
8 Schechtman 1996: 113, Rudd 2012: 180.  Galen Strawson claims that
some people never think about their lives in narrative terms, contrary to all
narrativist theories (Strawson 2008: 193f.).  We suspect that he has a more
demanding notion of narrative than other authors (cf. Schechtman 2007:
167-169).
7 We thank Philipp Rau for drawing our attention to this problem.
8death.  If you could eliminate your self-narratives for the duration of the
torture, you really would cease to exist and spare yourself the agony.
(Secret agents may find the skill worth cultivating.)  Unhappily, though, your
departure would create a new conscious being in your place--someone just
like you only lacking self-narratives.  She would take herself to be you (as
she would have all your memories), and mistakenly believe that the suicide
attempt had failed.  So even if deliberate narrative discontinuity spared you
from torture, someone else would suffer it.
To our knowledge, narrativists have never considered these points.
We have been discussing the troubling consequences of impure
narrativism, the view that a being existing at another time is you just if there
is narrative continuity linking you as you are now with her as she is then and
condition C is met.  But the view is also internally inconsistent.
Imagine that someone, call him Sigmund, acquires his first self-narratives
at age four and that they reach back a year.  Narrativism says that our
existence extends exactly as far into the past as the events featuring in our
identity-constituting narratives do.  So if Sigmund constructs his first self-
narratives in 1860, and they stretch a year into the past, then he must
begin to exist in 1859, three years after his birth (a surprising claim, but
weÕve been through that already).  In adult life, however, he may develop
self-narratives reaching back another year.  And again, narrativism says that
his existence extends just as far into the past as his identity-constituting
narratives do.  He must, then, have begun a year earlier.
The example is hardly fanciful.  In fact narrativists often emphasize that
our narratives are subject to revision (e.g. Rudd 2009: 65f.).  But it entails
two incompatible claims:  that Sigmund begins to exist in 1859 (as thatÕs
how far his first self-narratives reach), and that he begins in 1858 (as that
is the extent of his later self-narratives).  Call this the problem of shifting
narratives.
No doubt narrativism could be fixed to avoid the problem.  If the self-
narratives you have at different times in your life extend back to different
dates, it might be the ones extending to the earliest date that determine the
beginning of your existence.  So even if the self-narratives you develop in
your youth go back only a year, you might exist earlier than that owing to
stories you construct later.  And if at some point you should lose the self-
narratives that reach back to a certain date and retain only stories beginning
later, you might still exist at the earlier date owing to self-narratives you had
previously.  We might formalize the proposal like this:
Necessarily, if x is a person at a time t and y exists at another time t*,
x=y iff
(1) condition C holds, and either
(2) x is narratively continuous, at t, with y as it is at t*, or
9(3) someone is, at a time later than both t and t*, narratively continuous
both with x as it is at t and with y as it is at t*, or
(4) x is narratively continuous, at t, with someone as she is at a time
between t and t*, and that person is then narratively continuous with
y as it is at t*.
Call this proposal complex narrativism.  Whatever virtues it may have,
however, it does nothing to address the objections raised elsewhere in this
paper.  And it is unattractive in other ways.  If when we begin depends at
least partly on our self-narratives, why should it depend on only some of
them?  And why only on those that reach back furthest?  The narratives you
have early in life are not in any way shallow, inauthentic, or otherwise
defective simply because later ones extend further.  They may be stories of
just the sort that narrativists take to determine the length of our existence.
They would do so, according to complex narrativism, if no narratives you had
at other times reached back to an earlier date.  NarrativismÕs central
thought is that what makes an earlier being you is the narrative connections
you now have to that being as he or she was then (perhaps together with
condition C, which we assume to hold).  So if those connections now extend
back only to a certain time, thatÕs how far your existence ought to reach.
Complex narrativism allows that none of your current narratives make any
difference to when you began, simply because you later develop more far-
reaching ones.  You could never infer the date of your beginning from the
self-narratives you have at a given time:  they could always be overruled, as
it were, by stories you have at other times.  Few narrativists will welcome
this.
Here is a final difficulty. All the narrativist theories we have considered
imply that when we come into being depends on how far into the past certain
self-constituting narratives extend.  We exist at a past time only if we have
self-narratives now--or at some time, anyway--identifying ourselves as we
are at that time with a being existing at the past time.  And we create these
narratives after the events featuring in them:  first we do and experience
things; later we work them into stories.
How far back the stories reach depends on which events from our
childhood we remember and how much interest we take in them, among
other things.  They may extend only as far as events occurring at age four.
Or they may go back to age two or three.  It all depends on what happens
later:  on what stories we take up as we reflect on our past.
But if we come into being at the time of the earliest events in our self-
narratives, then the date of our beginning will depend on what we do later.
Had our later narratives differed in how far they reach into the past, we
should have begun at a different time.  We literally bring ourselves into being
in early childhood by developing narratives in later life.  (Those narrative
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acts are not sufficient for us to begin--our parentsÕ contribution was also
needed--but they are necessary.)  We begin to exist when we do because of
what happens later.  This is a case of backwards causation.
Metaphysicians disagree about whether backwards causation is ever
possible--in extraordinary cases such as time travel, for instance (Lewis
1976, Mellor 1998: 125-35)--but none of them believes that it happens in
common and familiar situations.  Yet persistence narrativism appears to
imply that backwards causation is an everyday occurrence.  No one could
come into being without it.  If affecting the past were as easy as that, we
ought to wonder why we cannot now bring it about that such baleful events
as the destruction of the library at Alexandria, the second world war, or the
election of certain presidents never happened.  For those whose lives have
gone badly wrong, there ought to be a remedy even better than suicide:
bringing it about that one never existed. This is hardly what narrativists have
in mind when they speak of our unique ability to Òcreate ourselvesÓ (Glover
1988: 131, DeGrazia 2005: 89f.).
We have been exploring the idea that some condition involving narrative
continuity is both necessary and sufficient for us to persist.  It implies that
we come into being years after we are born and that we can end our lives
simply by changing our way of thinking.  It leads to inconsistencies about our
beginnings, and entails that we literally bring ourselves into being as children
by later acts of narration.  No rival account of our persistence has these
consequences, and no one wants them.  We will devote the remainder of the
paper to attempts at salvaging persistence narrativism.
One thought is to give up the idea that identity-constituting narratives
must be autobiographical.  Other peopleÕs stories about our lives might be
relevant too.  Schechtman writes,
An identity-constituting narrative is not just a story you have about
yourself but also the stories others tell about you....Those without the
wherewithal to narrate their own lives (e.g. infants and those with
cognitive deficits) can be given an identity through narratives created by
others....What I propose is that we think of identity-constituting
narratives not just as the narratives we create for ourselves, but the
narratives of our lives that are created in conjunction with other people
(2014: 103f.; see also MacIntyre 1984: 218, Schechtman 1996: 133).
Our persistence might be determined not only by our own stories about
ourselves, but also by those that parents, friends, and biographers tell about
us.  People who are never able to tell their own stories may persist entirely
because of this.  Suppose, then, that a past being is you just if someone now
has narratives of the right sort identifying you with her as she was then (or
there is a chain of such narrative connections).  And a future being is you
11
just if the narratives that someone has at that future time identify her with
you as you are now (or, again, there is a chain of such connections).
Call this social narrativism.  It has the virtue of avoiding the implication
that we come into being years after our birth.  Even if infantile amnesia
prevents our own self-narratives from including events of the first two years
of life, those of others can fill in the gap.  Your parentsÕ story of you may
extend even to the moment of conception.
But itÕs hard to see many other advantages in social narrativism.  It may
imply that giving up your self-narratives would not by itself end your life:
the stories of others could secure your survival.  But it would still be possible
to destroy yourself without physical harm by getting everyone else to
expunge their narratives about you as well.
Nor does it solve the problem of shifting narratives.  Suppose, again, that
SigmundÕs mature self-narratives date his beginning to an earlier time than
his juvenile stories do.  If his own stories sufficed to determine his
persistence, this would have inconsistent consequences about when he
began.  Perhaps the stories of others might somehow cancel out this
inconsistency.  Still, it could happen that all those whose narratives
determine his persistence say first that he began at one time and later that
he began at another, with the same inconsistent result.  And this is only one
instance of a more general problem:  What happens when the narratives
constituting someoneÕs persistence disagree?  Suppose the stories of one
faction date SigmundÕs beginning to 1856 and those of another to 1858.
They cannot both determine his beginning.  Which ones count?  The trouble
threatens all narrativist accounts of persistence, but allowing multiple
narrators exacerbates it.
Social narrativism also threatens to revive the Shakespeare problem.
This time condition C is no help:  it requires you to remember the events
that figure in the relevant narratives, and social narrativism does away with
that requirement.  Nor does the proposal avoid backwards causation.  We
should still come into existence because of stories told later.  It makes no
difference who tells them.
A more promising thought might be to say that some narrative condition
is sufficient for us to persist, but not necessary.  (The corresponding view
that it is necessary but insufficient has no attraction.)  We could survive
without narrative continuity.  We actually did so during infancy, before the
earliest events that figure in our self-narratives.  We may do so again at the
end of our lives, after our narratives have been destroyed by senile
dementia.  But if a being is, at some past or future time, narratively
continuous with you as you are now (and C holds), she is you.  Call this weak
narrativism.  (It may be what Schechtman intended in the passage quoted in
¤1.)
Weak narrativism does not imply that we could end our lives by giving up
12
our self-narratives, and is consistent with our having existed as infants
before the earliest events in those narratives.  These consequences follow
only from the claim that narrative continuity is necessary for us to persist.
Likewise, it avoids the problem of shifting narratives by not implying that we
extend only as far back as our self-narratives do.  And for the same reason,
it does not imply that we bring ourselves into being retroactively by creating
self-narratives later in life:  for all it says, we may have existed before any
of the events that figure in those stories.
But it is unattractive in other ways.  It says, in effect, that our
persistence consists sometimes in narrative continuity and sometimes in
something else.  What makes you a certain pre-narrative toddler would
presumably be some sort of non-narrative continuity:  perhaps the
psychological continuity of Lockean views, or some sort of brute-physical
continuity as most animalists say.  And if your narratives were destroyed by
a deliberate effort of the sort described earlier (or perhaps by senile
dementia), you would again persist by virtue of non-narrative continuity.  Yet
during the Ònarrative periodÓ of your life, from the time of the first event
that figures in your self-narratives until those narratives are lost, only
narrative continuity counts, and the other forms of continuity are irrelevant.
Weak narrativism goes against the narrativistsÕ central claim:  that what
makes a being existing at another time you is a matter of narrative
continuity.  In this respect it resembles the view that psychological
continuity is sufficient but not necessary for us to persist (Olson 1997: 81-
85).  The thought is that we survive as foetuses by virtue of brute-physical
continuity, but once we acquire the relevant mental properties, this becomes
irrelevant and only psychological continuity matters--yet if we lapse into a
persistent vegetative state, our survival consists once again in brute-
physical continuity.  This is a view that almost no one holds:  all Lockeans we
know of say that some sort of psychological continuity is both necessary and
sufficient for us to persist.
Nor does weak narrativism answer the persistence question.  It does not
complete the biconditional formula set out in ¤1, but only its right-to-left
conjunct.  As an account of our persistence, it is radically incomplete.  It
tells us nothing about how long we existed before the earliest events in our
self-narratives.  For all it says, we might come into being at the time of
those events, between the ages of two and four.  Or it could be at birth, or
at conception, or perhaps earlier still.  You could even be Shakespeare
reincarnated.  Again, condition C is no help:  it was proposed as a necessary
condition for our persistence, and weak narrativism gives only sufficient
conditions.  Because your narrative continuity with Shakespeare would not
satisfy C (you canÕt remember events from his life), weak narrativism does
not entail that you lived in the 16th century.  But it doesnÕt rule it out either.
In fact, for all weak narrativism says, you could be Shakespeare even if you
now have no narrative connections with him as he was then.  If we want to
know when you began--what makes you the infant or foetus or Elizabethan
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poet you once were, if any--we must look to an account of persistence not
involving narratives.
Analogous questions arise about what happens when we lose our self-
narratives.  Does it destroy us?  Do we survive as long as there is
psychological continuity?  Do we carry on as lifeless corpses till only dust
remains?  Again, weak narrativism is silent.  An answer to these questions
requires an account of our persistence involving non-narrative continuity.
But if we need such an account to deal with the non-narrative periods of our
existence, why bother trying to combine it with a narrativist account?  Why
not simply accept that we persist in all circumstances by virtue of non-
narrative continuity?
Weak narrativism is messy, counterintuitive, and unprincipled.  And it still
appears to require backwards causation.  Although it does not imply that we
retroactively bring ourselves into being, it entails that what suffices for us to
persist changes in early childhood from non-narrative to narrative continuity.
The change takes place at the time of the earliest events that feature in our
identity-constituting narratives.  Both the occurrence and the time of this
change depend on what narratives we have later on.  Acts of storytelling in
our middle years are responsible for changes to our persistence conditions in
early childhood:  later facts or events cause earlier ones.
If this is the best narrativists can do in giving accounts of persistence,
theyÕre wasting their time.9  But we have given no objection to narrativist
answers to the characterization question.  It may still be that what makes
you the person you are has to do with narratives.  Narrativists can avoid the
problems we have discussed by confining themselves to characterization.10
A view making no claims about persistence runs no danger of implying that
some of us are Shakespeare reincarnated, that we could destroy ourselves
just by changing the way we think, or that we can affect the past.  It is even
consistent with our being organisms (DeGrazia 2005: 76).
The fact that narrativists have never considered these objections
suggests that many of them have not adequately distinguished the
characterization from the persistence question.  Their loose formulations,
10Though others remain:  see Witt in press.
9A proposal that we have been unable to consider would be to combine
persistence narrativism with an ontology of temporal parts (cf. Merkel et al.
2007: 259-271; Stokes 2012, Schroer and Schroer 2014).  Such an
ontology makes what appear to be metaphysical questions about personal
identity over time into linguistic questions about which Ôfour-dimensionalÕ
entities our personal pronouns and proper names refer to, entirely
transforming discussions of persistence (Olson 1997: 162-168, Sider 2001).
How its combination with narrativism would help to solve the problems we
have raised and whether anyone would find it attractive are large questions
for another occasion.
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which often leave uncertain which one is at stake, only reinforce this
diagnosis.  It would improve the narrativist literature to no end if all parties
made it completely clear what question they were trying to answer.11
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